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Abstract
Many recent studies in deep reinforcement learning (DRL) have proposed to boost
adversarial robustness through policy distillation utilizing adversarial training,
where additional adversarial examples are added in the training process of the
student policy; this makes the robustness improvement less flexible and more
computationally expensive. In contrast, we propose an efficient policy distillation
paradigm called robust policy distillation that is capable of achieving an adver-
sarially robust student policy without relying on any adversarial example during
student policy training. To this end, we devise a new policy distillation loss that
consists of two terms: 1) a prescription gap maximization loss aiming at simul-
taneously maximizing the likelihood of the action selected by the teacher policy
and the entropy over the remaining actions; 2) a Jacobian regularization loss that
minimizes the magnitude of Jacobian with respect to the input state. The theoretical
analysis proves that our distillation loss guarantees to increase the prescription gap
and the adversarial robustness. Meanwhile, experiments on five Atari games firmly
verifies the superiority of our policy distillation on boosting adversarial robustness
compared to other state-of-the-arts.
1 Introduction
The advancements in deep reinforcement learning (DRL) have demonstrated that deep neural networks
(DNNs) as powerful function approximators can be trained to prescribe near-optimal actions on many
complex tasks (e.g., Atari games [1] and robotics control [2]). Although remarkable achievements
have been documented, the vulnerabilities of DNNs [3] and many successful attacks on DRL [4–7]
have inspired us to improve the adversarial robustness of DRL policies, so as to defend against
adversarial attacks in real-world deployments.
To achieve adversarial defense, many studies have investigated using policy distillation [8] combined
with adversarial training [9] to obtain an accurate and robust student policy. In policy distillation, a
robust student policy indicates that the action prescription by student policy should be consistent with
the prescription by its teacher policy. With adversarial training, this consistency is learned through
optimizing the student policy with adversarial attacks in training data. To generate such attacks, fast
gradient sign method and projected gradient descent are respectively adopted by [10] and [11]. In a
nutshell, such adversarial robustness is achieved by additional procedures of generating adversarial
attacks in the training of student policy, which, however, makes improvements on robustness less
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flexible (e.g., adversarial robustness depending on one particular attack may fail when another attack
happens) and more computationally expensive.
Instead of learning this consistency using adversarial training, we prove in Section 3.2 that such
consistency can also be achieved by maximizing the student policy’s prescription gap between the
teacher selected action and the remaining actions under attack. Most importantly, we derive that
maximizing the prescription gap under attack can be transformed to simultaneously maximizing the
prescription without attack and minimizing the Jacobian with respect to input states; this provides
us the possibility of achieving adversarial robustness without generating any attack during training.
Therefore, we design a new policy distillation loss function that includes two parts: 1) prescription gap
maximization (PGM) loss, and 2) Jacobian regularization (JR) loss. The PGM loss is different from
most previous distillation loss functions (e.g., cross-entropy) that merely maximizes the probability of
the action selected by teacher policy. More importantly, we also maximize the entropy of those actions
not selected by the teacher policy, which enforces the student policy to have a larger prescription gap
in order to resist attacks. The entropy term is weighted by the probability of the selected action; this
allows the training to focus on accuracy at the beginning and pursue entropy maximization in the end.
In order to further improve the adversarial robustness, we minimize the magnitude of Jacobian with
respect to the input state, which is calculated based on PGM loss.
Our main contributions can be summarized as:
• We propose a novel policy distillation paradigm to achieve a robust student policy that can defend
adversarial attacks without relying on attack generation during training. In doing so, we design a
novel policy distillation loss function that contains: 1) a PGM loss for simultaneously maximizing
the probability of the action prescribed by teacher policy as well as the entropy of unwanted
actions; 2) a JR loss that minimizes the norm of Jacobian with respect to the input state.
• The theoretical analysis proves that our distillation loss guarantees to increase the prescription gap
and the adversarial robustness. Meanwhile, experiments on five Atari games show that the student
policies trained via our policy distillation loss are not only as accurate as teacher policies but also
more robust under adversarial attacks.
2 Related Work
In the context of DRL, Huang et al. [4] were among the first to analyze the vulnerability of DNN
policies, where they utilized the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [3] to generate adversarial
perturbations. Lin et al. [5] explored a more complicated scenario by partially perturbing only
selected frames, and they also investigated a designated targeted attack using a generative model.
Qu et al. [6] studied a minimalistic attack to showcase that merely perturbing a single pixel in a few
selected frames can significantly degrade the reward of state-of-the-art policies. Besides, Xiao et
al. [7] provided a survey that refers many other attacks on RL with different settings.
To resist adversarial attacks in DRL, there have been several works that study the adversarial defense
by using adversarial training. Mandlekar et al. [12] applied adversarial training on policy gradient
algorithm by leveraging a simple FGSM to generate adversarial examples, but they just tested on some
simple RL tasks. Pattanaik et al. [13] introduced much stronger attacks that are achieved by projected
gradient descent (PGD) in adversarial training on Atari games. However, the results showcase that
the robustness increase causes significant performance drop. To obtain better defense, Mirman et
al. [10] and Fischer et al. [11] proposed adversarial training based policy distillation to build a more
robust student policy, where FGSM and PGD are utilized respectively to generate adversarial attacks.
Recently, Zhang et al. [14] proposed a DNN verification based adversarial training that utilizes the
interval bound propagation (i.e., CROWN-IBP [15]) to boost robustness.
However, those adversarial training based approaches require additional procedures to generate
adversarial attacks; this makes improvements on adversarial robustness less flexible and more
computationally expensive. In contrast, our policy distillation approach is able to learn a robust
student policy that can defend against adversarial attacks without replying on any type of attack
generation during training.
2
3 Methodology
In this section, we first provide preliminaries on deep reinforcement learning and policy distillation,
and then formulate our investigated problem. Accordingly, we devise a novel policy distillation loss
LPD, consisting of a prescription gap maximization loss and a Jacobian regularization loss. The
proposed LPD is able to help achieve adversarial robustness of the student policy without depending
on any specific type of attack. Finally, we theoretically prove that our distillation can increase the
prescription gap and adversarial robustness.
3.1 Preliminaries
Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). In this paper, we consider a finite-horizon Markov decision
process (MDP) that consists of a 4-tuple (S,A, r, p), where S denotes the state space; A means
the action space with size |A|; r(st) is the reward function when state st transits to st+1 given
action at; and p represents the state transition function, e.g., p(st+1|st, at), that is controlled by the
environment. The aim of DRL algorithm (e.g., DQN [1]) is to maximize the expected discounted
rewardR(piθ) = E[
∑T
t=0 γ
tr(st)|piθ] following a policy piθ, where pi is parameterized by θ. However,
R(piθ) can be significantly degraded when an adversarial example δt : S → S exists in state st.
Note that in this paper piθ(st) represents a prescribed distribution in action space of the policy piθ
on state st; piθ(st, a) is the prescription on action a given policy piθ and state st. This δt is added
on the original state st in order to perturb the prescribed action distribution piθ(st + δt). Therefore,
the perturbed action at = argmaxa piθ(st + δt, a) may be sub-optimal, thus reducing the reward of
piθ. The expected perturbed accumulated reward is denoted asR(piθ) = E[
∑T
t=0 γ
tr(st, δt)|piθ]. To
defend against δt, adversarial training based policy distillations [11] have been used.
Policy Distillation (PD). We follow the problem setting of PD [8], where a teacher policy piθT (e.g.,
Q value approximator) is first learned by RL algorithms. The aim of PD is to learn a student policy
piθS that can mimic the behavior of its teacher policy piθT . Most importantly, the student policy can
even outperform its teacher policy with respect to: 1) higher accumulated reward value and 2) smaller
size of policy network. Generally, PD is formulated to minimise the loss function L(θS) between the
prescription from student policy piθS (st) and that from the pre-trained teacher policy piθT (st).
L(θS) = Est∼S [D(piθS (st), piθT (st))] , (1)
where D is a distance measurement and it usually adopts the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence [16]
or mean square error (MSE) [11]. Although PD has documented many success stories on reward
improvement [8] and policy network compression [16], the adversarial robustness of the student
policy piθS has been less investigated so far. Some recent advancements have studied the adversarial
defense by involving adversarial training in PD. In doing so, the loss function for a robust student
policy LR(θS) is reformulated as,
LR(θS) = Est∼S
[
max
δt
D (piθS (st + δt), piθT (st))
]
, ‖δt‖ 6 , (2)
where the norm value of δt is bounded by . In order to generate adversarial examples δt, many
attack models (e.g., FGSM [10] and PGD [11]) have been applied. In particular, Zhang et al. [14]
proposed a certified defense utilizing an interval bound propagation technique (i.e., CROWN-IBP),
but the certified bound is still iteratively obtained via forward and backward computation through
the network. In summary, these adversarial training based policy distillations require additional
procedures to generate adversarial examples; this makes adversarial robustness improvement less
flexible. For instance, the robustness obtained depending on one particular attack may fail when
the agent faces another attack. Furthermore, the generation of adversarial examples leads to more
computational cost. Hence, a natural question to ask is: can we build a distillation paradigm that is
capable of defending adversarial attacks without adversarial attacks in the training of student policy?
3.2 Problem Formulation
The aim of our policy distillation is to find a student policy piθS that can maximize the accumulated
reward R(piθS ) even with adversarial perturbation δt on state st, while the distillation training is
independent on adversarial attacks. In an MDP, the expected reward starting from st is denoted by
state value V (st):
V (st) = E
[∑T
k=1
γkr(st+k)|piθS
]
, (3)
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where γ is the discount factor. Thus, given adversarial perturbation δt on state st, the adversarial state
value V (st + δt) is formulated by,
V (st + δt) = E
[∑T
k=1
γkr(st+k, δt)|piθS
]
. (4)
Note that δt is only applied to st, reflecting the impact for state value after adding δt on state st.
According to Theorem 1 in [17], there is a relationship between V (st) and V (st + δt),
max
st∈S
{V (st)− V (st + δt)} 6 αmax
st∈S
max
‖δt‖6
D(piθS (st), piθS (st + δt)), (5)
where D(piθS (st), piθS (st + δt)) is the distance in action space between the student policy pre-
scription piθS (st) without attack and the prescription piθS (st + δt) with attack; α := 2[1 +
γ
(1−γ)2 maxst,at,st+1∈S×A×S [r(st, at)]] is a constant independent on piθS . Eq. (5) indicates that
the state value gap between V (st) and V (st + δt) has an upper bound relying on the distance
D(piθS (st), piθS (st + δt)) in action space. This motivates us to improve the adversarial robustness of
the student policy by directly minimizing D(piθS (st), piθS (st + δt)) during policy distillation.
Given a deterministic policy piθS , the action is selected as argmaxa piθS (st, a). The distanceD(piθS (st), piθS (st + δt)) can then be defined as
D(piθS (st), piθS (st + δt)) =
{
0, argmaxa piθS (st, a) = argmaxa piθS (st + δt, a)
1, otherwise
. (6)
Note that in policy distillation, the student policy is trained to be consistent with its teacher policy
piθT by satisfying aT = argmaxa piθT (st, a) = argmaxa piθS (st, a). Therefore, to minimize the
distance in Eq. (6), aT = argmaxa piθS (st + δt, a) is to be ensured. In other words, we need to
encourage the student policy piθS to choose the action aT selected by the teacher policy piθT , even
under the condition that the adversarial attack δt exists on state st. Accordingly, the following
proposition is put forth for a robust student policy based on a pre-trained teacher policy piθT .
Proposition 1 (Robust student policy) We assume that piθS and piθT are deterministic policies. The
optimal action chosen by the teacher policy piθT is aT = argmaxa piθT (st, a). Given bounded
adversarial perturbations δt, ‖δt‖ 6  on state st, we design the prescription gap of student policy
piθS as,
GθS (st + δt, aT ) = min
δt,‖δt‖6
[
piθS (st + δt, a
T )− piθS (st + δt, a)
]
,∀a ∈ A ∩ a 6= aT . (7)
Then, a robust distilled student policy piθS must guarantee GθS (st + δt, aT ) > 0.
Proposition 1 indicates that as long as GθS (st + δt, aT ) > 0, the action selected by the distilled
student policy under any adversarial perturbation ‖δt‖ 6  on state st is still aT . Hence, during
policy distillation, the value of piθS (st + δt, aT )− piθS (st + δt, a) needs to be maximized in order to
boost adversarial robustness. According to Taylor expansion [18], we have
piθS (st + δt, a
T ) = piθS (st, a
T ) + δt∇stpiθS (st, aT ) + ω1,
piθS (st + δt, a) = piθS (st, a) + δt∇stpiθS (st, a) + ω2,
(8)
where ω1 and ω2 are truncation errors. For ease of analysis we assume ω1−ω2 = 0. Thereby, Eq. (7)
can be transformed as,
GθS (st + δt, aT ) = min
δ,‖δt‖6
[
(piθS (st, a
T ) + δt∇stpiθS (st, aT ))− (piθS (st, a) + δt∇stpiθS (st, a))
]
=
[
piθS (st, a
T )− piθS (st, a)
]
+ min
δt,‖δt‖6
[
δt∇stpiθS (st, aT )− δt∇stpiθS (st, a)
]
=
[
piθS (st, a
T )− piθS (st, a)
]
+ min
δt,‖δt‖6
δt∇st
[
piθS (st, a
T )− piθS (st, a)
]
= GθS (st, aT ) + min
δt,‖δt‖6
δt∇stGθS (st, aT ).
(9)
Thus, in order to maximize the prescription gap GθS (st + δt, aT ), the first term GθS (st, aT ) in Eq.
(9) should be maximized. Note that δt is optimized by an attacker to impact GθS (st, aT ) negatively.
Although δt can not be controlled by piθS , we can control the Jacobian ∇stGθS (st, aT ) in policy
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distillation. Therefore, in maximizing robustness, the influence of the second term in Eq. (9) can be
reduced by minimizing the magnitude of the Jacobian
∥∥∇stGθS (st, aT )∥∥.
In sum, to maximize the prescription gap GθS (st + δt, aT ) with attack, we can alternatively
maximize GθS (st, aT ) without attack and simultaneously minimize the magnitude of Jacobian∥∥∇stGθS (st, aT )∥∥. Guided by this, we devise our distillation loss function in what follows.
3.3 Loss Function
Our policy distillation loss function LPD(θS) is proposed as,
LPD(θS) = Lpgm(θS) + βLjr(θS), (10)
where Lpgm(θS) is the prescription gap maximization loss that not only maximizes the likelihood on
action aT selected by teacher policy piθT , but also maximizes the entropy on the remaining actions;
Ljr(θS) is the Jacobian regularization loss that aims to boot the robustness via minimizing the
magnitude of Jacobian for st. The weight β controls the strength of Ljr(θS). We illustrate the details
of Lpgm(θS) and Ljr(θS) as follows.
Prescription GapMaximization (PGM). With the goal of maximizing the prescription gap between
action aT and the remaining actions in mind, we devise the PGM loss Lpgm(θS) as,
Lpgm(θS) = −piθS (st, aT )η ·
− |A|∑
a=1,a 6=aT
(
piθS (st, a)
1− piθS (st, aT )
)
log
(
piθS (st, a)
1− piθS (st, aT )
) , (11)
where piθS (st, a) is the prescription on action a; η ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. The rationale behind
Eq. (11) is that minimizing Lpgm(θS) enables to simultaneously maximize the likelihood of the
action aT selected by the teacher policy piθS (st, aT ), and the entropy over the remaining actions
−∑|A|
a=1,a 6=aT (
piθS (st,a)
1−piθS (st,aT ) ) log(
piθS (st,a)
1−piθS (st,aT ) ). The entropy maximization results in a smaller
maximum over action a, a ∈ A, a 6= aT . Hence, by maximizing piθS (st, aT ) at the same time, we
can facilitate a larger prescription gap GθS (st, aT ). Note that, the entropy calculation is weighted by
1
1−piθS (st,aT ) ; this makes the distillation training focus on maximizing piθS (st, a
T ) at the beginning
when piθS (st, aT ) is small. As piθS (st, aT ) increases during training, Lpgm(θS) gradually shifts
attention to the entropy maximization. In addition, η balances the maximization on piθS (st, aT ) and
entropy regularization.
Jacobian Regularization (JR). As derived in Eq. (9), a robust policy distillation requires minimizing
the Jacobian on the input st as additional regularization. The concept of JR was introduced by Drucker
and Le Cun [19] in double backpropagation to enhance generalization performance, where they trained
neural networks not only by minimizing the gradient on weights but the gradient with respect to the
input features. Hoffman et al. [20] utilized JR to increase the stability of image classifiers. However,
how to effectively exploit JR in RL adversarial defence, especially in the policy distillation process,
has so far remained under-explored. With that in mind, we thus propose the JR loss,
Ljr(θS) =
∥∥∥∥∂Lpgm(θS)∂st
∥∥∥∥
F
, (12)
where ∂Lpgm(θ
S)
∂st
indicates the Jacobian on state st w.r.t. the loss function Lpgm(θS); F represents
the Frobenius norm. It is worth noting that most start-of-the-art attack algorithms are on the basis
of utilizing the Jacobian, thus minimizing the magnitude of Jocobian intuitively provides weaker
gradient information; this makes a harder generation of δt for an attacker. In addition, according to
the analysis in [21], if we maximize the prescription gap, it is able to alleviate the issue of gradient
masking. A more detailed analysis on the improvement of adversarial robustness via minimizing the
magnitude of Jacobian is provided in Theorem 2.
3.4 Theoretical Analysis
To support the design of our loss function for robust policy distillation, we analyze the policy
prescription gap and the resultant improvement on adversarial robustness.
5
Theorem 1 (Policy prescription gap maximization) Given a particular prescription piθS (st, aT ) by
student policy piθS on the action aT , if the PGM loss Lpgm(θS) is minimized, we can ensure that the
prescription gap GθS (st, aT ) in Eq. (9) is maximized. Moreover, if piθS (st, aT ) > 1|A| where |A| is
the size of action space, GθS (st, aT ) is guaranteed to be positive.
The proof is deferred to Appendix A, which follows from the fact that maximum entropy is attained
when the distribution over actions is uniform. This results in a minimized piθS (st, a), in turn
maximizing the prescription gap GθS (st, aT ) =
[
piθS (st, a
T )− piθS (st, a)
]
. Given piθS (st, a) > 1|A| ,
we can derive that GθS (st, aT ) > 0.
Theorem 2 (Adversarial robustness) Given a student policy piθS and a minimized PGM loss
Lpgm(θS), we can guarantee an improvement on adversarial robustness if the JR loss Ljr(θS)
is minimized.
The proof is deferred to Appendix B, where the basic idea is that the minimized
∥∥∥ ∂Lpgm(θS)∂st ∥∥∥
minimizes the impact of adversarial attack δt on the PGM loss. Due to Theorem 1 has proved that
minimized PGM loss ensures a maximized prescription gap. Thus the prescription gap with attacks is
still maximized; this means an improvement on adversarial robustness.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
To provide a fair comparison, we test our approach on five Atari games (i.e., Freeway, Bank Heist,
Pong, Boxing and Road Runner) that are utilized in the state-of-the-arts [11, 14]. For each game,
the state is 4-stack of consecutive frames, and each frame is pre-processed to size 84× 84, where
the pre-processing applies the environment wrapper based on the Arcade learning environment in
Rainbow. After preprocessing, the pixel value from [0, 255] is normalized to [0, 1]1.
Teacher Policy Training. In our evaluation, the teacher policy is trained by DQN, where the network
structure is based on Dueling-DQN and Noisy-Net following Rainbow [22]. Each teacher policy is
trained with 4 million frames on a particular game (see source code2), which costs 12-40 hours on
Nvidia 2080Ti. The other parameter settings for teacher policy training are provided in Appendix C.
Student Policy Distillation Training. In our implementation, the network structure of student
policy piθS uses the Nature-DQN structure [1]. To train the student policy, we collect 1 × 105
state-prescription pairs [st, piθT (st)] from the teacher policy θT , where 90% are treated as training
data and the remaining 10% as testing data. We use Adam as the optimizer, and the implementation is
based on Keras. The rest hyperparameter settings for policy distillation are provided in Appendix D.
Adversarial Attacks. To be align with the compared state-of-the-arts [11, 14], we use the untargeted
Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) attack that performs K- iteration updates of adversary δt, given by:
sk+1 = sk +

K
P
(
∂H(piθS (sk), aT )
∂sk
)
, s0 = st, k = 0, 1, · · · ,K − 1, (13)
where sk+1 is the attacked input state with adversarial perturbation inside; H(piθS (sk), aT ) is the
cross-entropy loss between student policy prescription piθS (sk) and the one-hot vector encoded
based on action aT selected by teacher policy. P is an operator projecting the input gradient into
a constrained norm ball.  and K are the total norm constraint and the norm constraint for each
iteration step, respectively. We explore three different values {4, 10, 20} of K, where K = 4 and
K = 10 are investigated in [11] and [14], respectively. We further explore the PGD attack with
K = 20, that corresponds to a stronger attack than previous studies. The implementation of PGD
attack is based on the adversarial robustness toolbox [23].
Evaluation Metric. In previous studies of adversarial robustness on DRL, the accumulated rewards
under attack (i.e., usually PGD attack) are treated as the evaluation metric. However, in policy
distillation, the performance of teacher policy (as a baseline model) also has a significant impact on
1Our code will be released upon acceptance.
2https://github.com/Kaixhin/Rainbow
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Table 1: Averaged accumulated rewards over 15 episodes with and without PGD attack. The
comparison with previous studies under PGD attack with different PGD iteration step K. Since the
results on Boxing from Zhang et al. [14] has been not reported, we mark them as NA.
Method Evaluation Case
Atari Games
Freeway Bank Hesit Pong Boxing Road Runner
Ours
No-attack 32.93± 0.25 1614.67± 12.58 21± 0 71.60± 9.26 16013.3± 1831.89
PGD (K = 4) 32.61± 2.18 1606.67± 23.57 20.3± 0.79 70.20± 8.52 16120.3± 4665.93
PGD (K = 10) 30.63± 1.53 1614.0± 16.65 20.3± 0.67 72.40± 8.43 15953.3± 2834.28
PGD (K = 20) 31.53± 1.45 1614.67± 9.57 20.1± 0.94 70.20± 8.52 14160.0± 3091.67
RS-DQN [11]
No-attack 32.93 238.66 19.73 80.67 12106.67
PGD (K = 4) 32.53 190.67 18.13 50.87 5753.33
SA-DQN [14]
No attack 30.78± 0.5 1041.4± 12.3 21.0± 0 NA 15172.0± 791.7
PGD (K = 10) 30.36± 0.7 1043.6± 9.5 20.1± 0.0 NA 15280.0± 827.7
Table 2: Comparison of relative robustness measured byM(·) in Eq. (14) based on the results in
Table 1. The comparison with previous studies under PGD attack with different PGD iteration K.
Method Evaluation Case
Atari Games
Freeway Bank Hesit Pong Boxing Road Runner
Ours
M(piθS PGD(K = 4), piθT ) −0.58% 0.25% −3.33% −26.05% −61.12%
M(piθS PGD(K = 4), piθS ) −0.97% −0.49% −3.33% −1.96% 0.67%
M(piθS PGD(K = 10), piθT ) −6.62% 0.71% −3.33% −23.73% −61.52%
M(piθS PGD(K = 10), piθS ) −6.98% −0.04% −3.33% 1.12% 0.37%
M(piθS PGD(K = 20), piθT ) −3.87% 0.74% −4.29% −26.05% −65.85%
M(piθS PGD(K = 20), piθS ) −4.25% 0.00% −4.29% −1.96% −11.57%
[11]
M(RS-DQN PGD(K = 4),DQN) −1.42% −14.11% −10.24% −46.93% −38.83%
M(RS-DQN PGD(K = 4),RS-DQN) −1.21% −19.87% −8.11% −36.94% −52.48%
[14]
M(SA-DQN PGD(K = 10),DQN) −7.72% −20.24% −2.90% NA −58.64%
M(SA-DQN PGD(K = 10), SA-DQN) −1.65% 0.21% −4.29% NA 0.71%
the reward of the distilled student policy; this inspires us to further design a new evaluation metric
named as relative robustnessM(Rδ,RB),
M(Rδ,RB) = Rδ −RBRB · 100% (14)
where Rδ is the accumulated reward achieved by the student policy under attack, and RB is the
accumulated reward achieved by the baseline policy (either teacher policy or student policy) without
attack. This metric provides a percentage variation of accumulated rewards, which can measure the
relative robustness when comparing different policy distillations with different baselines. Hence, we
contend that it should be treated as a complement metric for evaluating adversarial robustness.
4.2 Experimental Results
Evaluation of Distilled Student Policy piθS . We evaluate the robustness the student policy trained
by our robust policy distillation, and compare our results with state-of-th-arts, including (1) Fischer
et al. [11] where DQN is the baseline policy; RS-DQN is the distilled student policy and (2) Zhang et
al. [14] where DQN is the baseline policy; SA-DQN is the adversarially trained policy. The results
are presented in Table 1.
In general, the accumulated rewards of our distilled policies piθS under PGD attack are larger
than those of both state-of-the-arts; this indicates that our defensive distillation loss can achieve a
significant robustness. Specifically, several interesting findings are noted. (1) Under PGD (K = 4)
attack, our piθS PGD (K = 4) achieves a much higher reward than that of [11]. Especially on Bank
Heist and Road Runner, our piθS PGD (K = 4) achieves rewards of 1606.67 and 16120.3 respectively,
whilst in [11] they only get 190.67 and 5753.33. Another noteworthy finding is on Boxing, where
although the performance of our teacher policy piθT is worse than the DQN in [11], our piθS PGD
(K = 4) still outperforms RS-DQN in [11]. (2) The similar superiority of our approach can also be
found in PGD (K = 10) attack versus Zhang et al. [14]. The performance of our piθT is comparable
with that of DQN in [14]. However, the performance of our piθS is better than that of SA-DQN [14]
with and without PGD (K = 10) attack. For instance, on Bank Heist, our piθT achieves almost the
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Figure 1: The adversarial robustness comparison between teacher policy piθT and student policy piθS
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Figure 2: Comparison of prescription gap between teacher policy piθT and student policy piθS
same rewards with that of DQN [14], but our piθS PGD (K = 10) gains much higher rewards in
comparison with SA-DQN and SA-DQN PGD (K = 10) [14]. (3) Additionally, we also test piθS
with PGD (K = 20) attack, and the results imply that our robust policy distillation is capable of
resisting stronger attacks. Most importantly, all the aforementioned superiority of our approach is
achieved without leveraging any adversarial example; this showcases our approach is not only more
robust but also computationally cheaper.
Evaluation of Relative Robustness. We further examine the relative robustnessM(·) defined in
Eq. (14) of all comparisons. The results are summarized in Table 2. From the comparison on PGD
(K = 4) attack, our approach performs consistently better than that in [11]. Especially on Bank
Hesit,M(RS-DQN PGD(K = 4),DQN) shows a performance degradation with−14.11%, whereas
our M(piθS PGD(K = 4), piθT ) even reaches a positive reward increase with 0.25%. A similar
observation is noted on Road Runner, where ourM(piθS PGD(K = 4), piθS ) achieves 0.67%; in
contrast,M(RS-DQN PGD(K = 4),RS-DQN) has a significant drop with −52.48%. Furthermore,
the comparison on PGD (K = 10) attack also suggests our approach achieves higher relative
robustness. For instance, on Bank Heist, ourM(piθSPGD(K = 10), piθT ) obtains a positive 0.71%
that far exceeds −20.24% from M(SA-DQN PGD(K = 10),DQN) [14]. Lastly, even under a
stronger PGD (K = 20) attack, our approach still achieves a noticeable robustness in comparison
with state-of-the-arts.
Robustness Comparison between piθT and piθS . In this part, we further compare the robustness
between our own teacher policy piθT and student policy piθS . The results are depicted in Figure 1. As
a whole, the rewards of teacher policies decrease significantly under attacks. In contrast, the rewards
of student policies keep remarkably robust under attacks. In Figure 1 (1) on Freeway, all the rewards
of teacher policy under attacks are 0, therefore, we cannot observe the bar. Contrarily, on Freeway,
Bank Heist and Pong, we observe that the student policies achieve approximately same rewards with
their teacher policies and keep stable under attacks; this suggests that our distillation can achieve
robustness without sacrificing performance on rewards. Although on Boxing and Road Runner the
student policies cannot get rewards as high as their teacher policies, they still perform more robustly
when attacks happen.
Analysis of Prescription Gap. To examine our claim on improving adversarial robustness via
maximizing the prescription gap between optimal action and other sub-optimal actions, we compare
the prescription gap between the teacher policy piTθ and student policy pi
S
θ as shown in Figure 2.
Assuming a prescription distribution P = [p0, p1, · · · , pN ], the prescription gap is calculated as
pi∗ − maxj 6=i∗ pj , where i∗ = argmaxi pi. From Figure 2, on all the five games tested, the
prescription gap values of student policies are far larger than those of teacher policies. Together with
the above robustness analysis, it empirically demonstrates that the robustness of DRL policies are
indeed improved via maximizing the prescription gap based on our policy distillation loss in Eq. 10.
Analysis of Hyper-parameter β. We analyze the impact of β in Eq. (10) which controls the weight
of JR loss. From the experimental results shown in Appendix E, we observe that as β increases, the
accumulated reward of the distilled student policy under attack generally first goes up and then drops.
Such observation is consistent with our analysis in Theorem 2, where the adversarial robustness is
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based on a minimized Lpgm(θS). Therefore, a too large β will overemphasize the contribution of the
JR loss, thus hurting the accumulated rewards of student policy even without attacks.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes an efficient policy distillation paradigm to achieve a robust student policy that is
capable of defending adversarial attacks without adversarial attacks during training. To this end, we
introduce a novel distillation loss that consists of PGM loss and JR loss. Through theoretical analysis,
we prove that our policy distillation ensures to increase the prescription gap between the optimal and
sub-optimal actions as well as the adversarial robustness. Experiments on five Atari games show that
our distilled student policy significantly outperforms the state-of-the-arts under strong attacks.
Broader Impact
In recent years, many success stories from DRL have been documented. However the vulnerabilities
of DRL policies set a severe constraint on their real-world deployments, especially in those safety
critical tasks (e.g., self-driving cars). Our approach can provide a realistic solution for improving
the adversarial robustness of a deployed DRL policy. Through our robust policy distillation, we can
train an accurate and robust student policy just according to the behaviour of the deployed DRL
policy. It is noteworthy that our robust policy distillation is independent on any adversarial example;
thus making our approach more realistic compared to adversarial training based methods. Taking
self-driving car as an example, to improve adversarial robustness, the adversarial training requires the
car to witness a huge mount of accidents as adversarial example. In contrast, such dangerous and
un-affordable adversarial example is not required anymore in our robust policy distillation.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Given the condition that piθS (st, aT ) is a particular prescription, we define piθS (st, aT ) = C as a
constant. Then the PGM loss in Eq. (11) can be rewritten as,
Lpgm(θS) = −Cη ·
− |A|∑
a=1,a6=aT
(
piθS (st, a)
1− C
)
log
(
piθS (st, a)
1− C
) , (15)
As C ∈ (0, 1), we can get 1− C ∈ (0, 1) and Cη ∈ (0, 1) where η is a positive constant. Therefore,
minimizing Lpgm(θS) is equal to maximizing the entropy h(piθS (st, a)),
h(piθS (st, a)) = −
|A|∑
a=1,a 6=aT
piθS (st, a) log(piθS (st, a)). (16)
Given piθS (st, aT ) = C, we have
∑
a=1,a 6=aT piθS (st, a) = 1− C. According to the information theo-
rem [24], the maximum of h(piθS (st, a)) is obtained when the distribution of piθS (st, a) is uniform;
this results in a minimum piθS (st, a) = 1−C|A|−1 . Thereby, we can get the maximized prescription gap
GθS (st, aT ) = C −
1− C
|A| − 1
=
|A|
|A| − 1C −
1
|A| − 1 .
(17)
If piθS (st, aT ) = C > 1|A| , then we can get GθS (st, aT ) > 0.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
In our policy distillation, the PGM loss Lpgm(θS) is optimized to simultaneously maximize the
probability on action aT and the prescription gap GθS (st, aT ) as shown in the proof of Theorem 1.
Therefore, in order to keep the policy piθS robust to adversarial attack δt, ‖δt‖ 6 , we have to ensure
the PGM loss is still minimized with adversarial attack δt. For ease of analysis, we rewrite the PGM
loss Lpgm(θS) as a function of st,
Lpgm(st) = −piθS (st, aT )η ·
− |A|∑
a=1,a6=aT
(
piθS (st, a)
1− piθS (st, aT )
)
log
(
piθS (st, a)
1− piθS (st, aT )
) . (18)
The PGM loss under adversarial attack δt is Lpgm(st + δt). Using Taylor expansion, we have
Lpgm(st + δt) = Lpgm(st) + δt ∂Lpgm(st)
st
+ ωpgm,∀δt, ‖δt‖ 6 . (19)
We assume ωpgm is a small value that can be ignored. Note that δt is generated by the attacker to
negatively impact our distilled policy, which makes δt not controllable from the distillation training
perspective. Therefore, to minimize the impact of δt
∂Lpgm(st)
st
, we can alternatively minimize the
magnitude of Jacobian
∥∥∥ ∂Lpgm(st)st ∥∥∥.
In summary, given that the Lpgm(st) without attack is minimized, if we minimize the norm of
Jacobian
∥∥∥ ∂Lpgm(st)st ∥∥∥, we can still achieve an minimized PGM loss Lpgm(st + δt) with adversarial
attack δt. Therefore, even with adversarail atttack δt, the loss Lpgm(st + δt) can still be minimized,
which leads to a maximized GθS (st, aT ) > 0 as proved in Theorem 1. Accordingly, we can conclude
that the adversarial robustness is improved.
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Appendix C: Parameter Settings for Training Teacher Policy
Table 3 provides the hyper-parameter settings for training the teacher policy. In this paper, we use
Rainbow DQN [22] to train the teacher policy, and explanations of each parameter can refer to [22].
Table 3: Hyper-parameters settings for training teacher policy piθT
Parameters Settings Descriptions
Optimizer Adam –
Batch size 32 –
Learning rate 0.000625 Adam learning rate
φ1 0.9 Adam decay rate 1
φ2 0.999 Adam decay rate 2
Adam-eps 1.5× 10−4 Adam epsilon
Start steps 2× 104 Number of steps before starting training
Environment ID 123 The random seed in Arcade environment
T-max 1× 107 Number of training steps
Max-episode-len 108× 103 Maximum episode length in game frames
h 4 Number of consecutive states processed
Hidden-size 512 Network hidden size
σ 0.1 Initial standard deviation of noisy linear layers
Atoms 51 Discretised size of value distribution
V-min -10 Minimum of value distribution support
V-max 10 Maximum of value distribution support
Memory-length 1× 106 The length of replay buffer
Target-update 1× 104 The frequency of updating target network
Appendix D: Parameter Settings for Our Proposed Policy Distillation of piθS
Table 4 shows all the settings of parameters used to train the robust student policy with the loss
function proposed in Section 3.3.
Table 4: Hyper-parameters settings for our proposed policy distillation of piθS .
Parameters Settings Descriptions
Batch size 32 –
Learning rate 0.00004 Adam learning rate
φ1 0.9 Adam decay rate 1
φ2 0.999 Adam decay rate 2
Adam-eps 1× 10−7 Adam epsilon
Max-epoch 1000 The maximum number of epochs for policy distillation training
Patience 60 Number of epochs that have no training improvement
β 0.1 To control the weight of Ljr(θS) in Eq. (10)
η 1/3 Discount factor on piθS (st, a
T ) in Eq. (11)
ϕ 0.9 Weight balances Jacobian scale and Jacobian consistency in Eq. (12)
τ 0.95 Discount factor on Jacobian consistency with frame skip in Eq. (12)
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Appendix E: Analysis of Hyper-parameter β
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Figure 3: The comparison of distilled student policies with different value of β.
To analyze the impact of β in Eq. (10) which controls the weight of JR loss, we test 8 different settings
on β that are shown in Figure 3. Note that β = 0 represents the loss function does not consider
the JR loss. From Figure 3, we observe that as long as β 6= 0, the distilled policies always behave
robustly. In addition, as β increases, the accumulated reward of the distilled policy with no attack
gradually decreases; this indicates that overemphasizing of JR loss can hurt the accumulated reward
without attack. This observation is consistent with our analysis in Theorem 2, where the adversarial
robustness is based on a minimized Lpgm(θS). Therefore, a too large β will overemphasize the
contribution of the JR loss, thus hurting the accumulated rewards of student policy even without
attacks. Moreover, the accumulated rewards under attack show that if we set β as a suitable value
(e.g., β = 0.001, β = 0.01 or β = 0.1), the distilled policies can behave robustly without sacrificing
the reward.
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